Fewel & Dawes Inc. v. Pratt by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
1-27-1941
Fewel & Dawes Inc. v. Pratt
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Fewel & Dawes Inc. v. Pratt 17 Cal.2d 85 (1941).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/8
.. 
84 NEBLETT V. STATE BAR. [17 C. (2d) 
ing arose. It is true that the particular defendant was early 
relieved of liability in that action on an order of dismissal 
and his representation by the challenged member of the Board 
of Governors was but nominal. It is also true that in re-
sponse to petitioner's motion to dismiss this proceeding be-
cause of said member's alleged disqualification and the as-
serted resulting deficient vote of qualified members of the 
Board of Governors, an affidavit has been filed herein by the 
challenged member in which he avers that at the time of his 
participation in the deliberations and voting of the board 
in this disciplinary proceeding he had "completely forgot-
ten" his prior and nominal representation of one of the minor 
defendants in the libel action. He likewise disclaimed all 
"feeling favorable or unfavorable" toward petitioner by rea-
son thereof. We do not question the sincerity or honesty of 
purpose of the. particular member. Nor do we find it neces-
sary to here pass upon either the timeliness or the merits of 
the challenge directed at him, for obviously our conclusion to 
dismiss this proceeding without prejudice for reasons already 
mentioned will effectively serve to remove the circumstance 
which petitioner asserts has resulted in the recommendation 
of his disbarment by a vote of an insufficient number of quali-
fied members of the Board of Governors. This latter circum-
stance is but another factor tending to establish the reason-
ableness of our disposition of this proceeding in a manner to 
eliminate all vestige of claimed unfairness. 
In conclusion, it may also be pointed out that such course 
will likewise serve to afford petitioner the requested oppor-
tunity to further challenge the testimony of the president of 
The Newberry Electric Corporation. The respondent State 
Bar denied a similar request upon the ground that it already 
had made its recommendation to this court and had lost juris-
diction of the proceeding. It appears from the findings herein 
that the respondent State Bar has placed much reliance upon 
the testimony of said witness particularly in so far as it differs 
from petitioner's explanation of his dealings with that com-
pany. In a supplemental affidavit filed in support of his 
motion to dismiss this proceeding upon the ground last above 
discussed, the petitioner avers that in the argument before 
the Board of Governors the State Bar examiner had cast some 
aspersion upon or had questioned the accuracy of at least a 
portion of the testimony of the designated witness, who had 
been called by. the respondent. We do not find in the record 
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now before us any denial by the State Bar of such challenge 
of its own witness and, as stated, our indicated disposal of 
this proceeding will not foreclose the petitioner from further 
challenging the witness' testimony in any particular desired. 
Therefore, in view of the pendency of the libel action out 
of which this proceeding arose, and in view of the unsatis-
factory state of the record herein in the respects mentioned, 
we are of the opinion that the ends of justice will best be 
served and the valuable right to practice law will more effec-
tively be guarded by a dismissal of this proceeding without 
prejudice, to await whatever proceedings the respondent 
State Bar deems appropriate upon the later determination of 
the libel litigation. 
It is so ordered. 
Edmonds, J., and Houser, J., did not participate in the con-
sideration or decision of this matter. 
A petition for a rehearing and for modification was denied 
February 20, 1941. Edmonds, J., and Houser, J., did not 
participate. 
[L. A. No. 16070. In Bank.-January 27, 1941.] 
FEWEL & DAWES, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, v. 
FRANKLIN L. PRATT, Appellant. 
[1] Appeal and Error-Review-Questions of Law and Fact-In-
sufficiency of Evidence Generally-Sufficiency of Evidence to 
Support Findings - Findings upon Con:fiicting Evidence-
Where There is Sufficient or Substantial Evidence.-A finding 
of the trial court upon conflicting evidence will not be dis-
turbed on appeal if there is evidence of a substantial char-
acter which reasonably supports it. But a finding may be 
set aside where the evidence in support thereof is so slight 
and tenuous that it does not create a real and substantial 
coniiict. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Appeal and Error, §§ 1280, 12134; 
2. Corporations, § 730; 3. Contracts, § 76; 4. Licenses, § 58; 
5. Novation, § 2; 6. Contracts, § 74; 7. Contracts, § 82; 8. Ap-
peal and Error, § 1089. 
" 
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[2] Corporations-Powers, Punctions and Liabilities-Contracts-
Contracts Before Incorporation-Evidence.-A finding that a 
person was acting on behalf of a corporation to be formed 
in making an agreement with the defendant cannot be sus-
tained where (a) the written memorandum of the contract 
made no reference to the corporation, (b) the defendant 
repeatedly insisted that he would not deal with such per-
son's associates, and (c) the assignment of the contract to 
the corporation by such party states the contract to be 
between himself and the defendant as individuals. This 
is true despite an ambiguous statement of the defendant in 
the course of their negotiations that he did not want to do 
business with the corporation, but would do business through 
it with such party, and of the party's statement that he could 
not work without his associates. (Three judges dissenting.) 
[3] Contracts-Legality-Effect of Illegality-Enforceability Gen-
erally.-A contract which requires the performance of un-
lawful acts is unenforceable. (See Civ. Code, secs. 1608, 
1667.) 
[4] Licenses-License of Occupations-Nonpayment as Affecting 
Contracts-In General-Contract to Divide Insurance Commis-
sions.-A' person not licensed to act as an insurance broker 
or agent cannot enforce a contract between himself and a li-
censed broker to divide commissions on insurance business. 
[5] Novation-Introductory":-'Requisites Generally.-No novation 
is effected by an assignment by a party to a contract with 
an insurance broker with reference to the division of commis-
sions on certain insurance, where the assignment is merely 
a transfer of the right to receive payments of money in re-
turn for a valuable consideration, and there is no assumption 
of obligations by the assignee. 
[6] Contracts-Legality-Effect of Illegality-In General-Rati-
fication.-An illegal contract cannot be ratified, and no person 
can be estopped from denying its validity. And so a party 
to a contract is not estopped from denying its validity be-
cause of his acceptance of receipts in the name of another to 
conceal the illegality of the transaction. 
[7] Id.-LegalitY-Effect of Illegality-Pleading Illegality.-An 
appellate court may refuse to enforce a contract that is 
illegal as a matter of law regardless of the pleadings of the 
parties. 
4. Failure of broker to procure license as affecting validity 
or enforceability of contracts, notes, 30 A. L. R. 852; 42 A. L. R. 
1228; U8 A. L. R. 647. See, also, 4 Cal. Jur. 552, 613; 8 Am. 
Jur. 997, 1076; 29 Am. Jur. 134; 4 R. C. L. 246, 301. 
" 
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[8] Appeal and Error-Review-Persons Entitled to Allege Errors 
-Waiver of Right to Urge Error.-A party defendant is not 
precluded from raising on appeal the question of illegality 
of the contract sued on where he denied liability under the 
contract in his answer and introduced evidence showing the 
illegality, where he moved to vacate the judgment and have 
judgment entered in his favor on this ground, and where he 
urged the question on appeal as ground for reversal. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. J. A. Smith and Ruben S. Schmidt, Judges. 
Reversed. 
Hugh Ward Lutz for Appellant. 
Hulen C. Callaway and Joe Crail, Jr., for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The appellant, l!'ranklin L. Pratt, a li-
censed life insurance broker, had written several policies of 
life insurance for John G. Bullock of Los Angeles. In 1928 
Bullock decided to take out additional life insurance amount-
ing to $150,000 under an arrangement that would enable his 
son-in-law, Richard W. Fewel, to receive half of the com-
missions. Fewel was in debt to Bullock, and the latter wanted 
him to earn a share of the commissions so that he could 
meet his obligations. On July 10, 1928, Pratt and Fewel 
met in Bullock's office to make arrangements for working 
together. Pratt refused to work with Fewel's associates and 
insisted that the agreement. be with Fewel alone. Fewel 
maintained that he could not work without his associates. 
When they finally agreed to work together and to divide 
the commissions so earned, they went to the office of Pratt 
who executed the following writing: 
"July 10, 1928 
"Mr. Richard W. Fewel, 
, "716 South Spring St., 
"Los Angeles. 
"Dear Mr. Fewel: 
"This is to confirm our verbal understanding of this date 
that we will work together in the purchase of insurance for 
Mr. John G. Bullock, on the basis of an equal division of the 
commissions. 
"Very truly yours, 
"F. L. P." 
'. 
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Fewel accepted this writing as embodying the terms of the 
agreement and there is no question as to its authenticity. 
Neither at that time nor since was Fewel licensed as 
an insurance broker or agent. At the time of the agree-
ment, however, he was planning to organize a corporation 
to carryon an insurance business. His plans materialized 
with the incorporation of Moore, Fewel & Company on July 
30, 1928, which was duly licensed as an insurance broker 
on August 10, 1928. On September 1, 1928, Fewel, an officer 
and director of this company, assigned to it his interest in 
the agreement with Pratt. The company subsequently as-
signed its rights under the contract to its successor, Moore, 
Fewel & Devlin, Inc., which in turn assigned them to Moore, 
Fewel & Dawes. The latter subsequently changed its name 
to Fewel & Dawes, respondent herein. Richard W. Fewel 
has been at all times an officer of these corporations. 
None of the life insurance policies contemplated by this 
agreement was secured until 1930. In 1930, 1931, and 1932, 
Pratt wrote various life insurance policies for Bullock with 
the cooperation of Fewel. On July 31, 1930, Pratt and Fewel 
made their first division of commissions. Pratt objected that 
the payment of commissions to Fewel would be illegal be-
cause the latter had no license. It was therefore agreed that 
Fewel should issue a receipt signed" Moore, Fewel & Devlin 
by Richard W. Fewel" to enable Pratt to show a legal trans-
action on his books. Pratt made out his check for the com-
missions to Fewel personally. Fewel deposited the check in 
his private account which he alone used. Other commissions 
were subsequently divided in the same manner, the last divi-
sion being made on February 19, 1931. On September 15, 
1933, John G. Bullock died. On December 15, 1935, Fewel & 
Dawes, the last assignee of Fewel's right to commissions un-
der the agreement with Pratt, brought suit against Pratt 
for unpaid commissions. The trial court gave judgment for 
plaintiff, and defendant Pratt has appealed. 
The trial court found that Fewel was acting on behalf of the 
corporation Moore, Fewel & Company in making the agree-
ment with Pratt. There is, however, no substantial evidence 
that Pratt agreed to contract with an actual or contemplated 
corporation rather than with Fewel. Plaintiff has failed to 
sustain the burden of proving that Pratt gave the assent 
necessary to the completion of such a contract. On the con-
trary/ it is undisputed that Pratt repeatedly insisted he would 
-~ 
i 
I 
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not work with Fewel's associates and would enter into a 
contract only with Fewel individually. Fewel's statement 
that he could not work without his associates in no way es-
tablishes that Pratt contracted with Fewel and his associ-
ates as a corporation. The question is not how Fewel in-
tended to carryon his business, but who were the parties 
to the contract. Fewel's statement could not make the cor-
poration a party to the contract without Pratt's agreement. 
The terms of the contract set forth in the memorandum writ-
ten by Pratt and accepted by Fewel make no mention of a 
corporation as party to the contract. They clearly indicate 
the contract to be between Pratt and Fewel as individuals. 
[1] A finding of the trial court upon conflicting evidenCl) 
will not be disturbed on appeal if there is evidence of a 
substantial character which reasonably supports the judg-
ment. (Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. (2d) 409 [71 Pac. 
(2d) 220]; Reese v. Smith, 9 Cal. (2d) 324 [70 Pac. (2d) 
933]; Tobias v. Adams, 201 Cal. 689 [258 Pac. 588]; Le-
frooth v. Prentice, 202 Cal. 215 [259 Pac. 947] ; Thoreau v. 
Industrial Accident Commission, 120 Cal. App. 67 [7 Pac. 
(2d) 767] ; Gamberg v. Industrial Accident Com'mission, 138 
Cal. App. 424 [32 Pac. (2d) 413] ; Gardiner v. Holcomb, 82 
Cal. App. 342 [255 Pac. 523]; Houghton v. Loma Prieta 
Lumber Co., 152 Cal. 574 [93 Pac. 377] ; Field v. Shorb, 99 
Cal. 661 [34 Pac. 504] ; Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal. App. 
119 [180 Pac. 67]; White v. Greenwood, 52 Oal. App. 737 
[199 Pac. 1095]; Elliott v. Market St,reet Ry. Co., 4 Cal. 
App. (2d) 292 [40 Pac. (2d) 547].) If, however, the evi-
dence is so slight and tenuous that it does not create a 
real and substantial conflict the finding may be set aside. 
(Ibid.) "There must be more than a conflict of words to 
constitute a conflict of evidence. The contrary evidence must 
be of a substantial character, such as reasonably supports 
the judgment .... " (Herbert v. LankersMm, supra.) 
[2] In the present case the only evidence in the entire 
record which tends to indicate that Pratt agreed to contract 
with Fewel on behalf of the corporation is the following 
statement by Fewel: "He said 'I don't want to do business 
with the corporation, but I will do business through your 
corporation with you.' " This statement, in itself contra-
dictory and ambiguous, appears in the course of testimony 
by Fewel that Pratt insisted he would not do business witb 
the corporation but only' with Fewel personally. Nowhere 
.. 
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in Fewel's testimony is there an unequivocal statement that 
Pratt agreed to contract with the corporation or with Fewel 
on behalf of the corporation. Against his ambiguous state-
ment there stands not merely his other statements that Pratt 
would not do business with the corporation, and Pratt's tes-
timony that he contracted with Fewel personally and not 
with the corporation; there stands also the written memo-
randum embodying the terms of the agreement, which makes 
no reference to the corporation but clearly states the con-
tract to be between Pratt and Fewel as individuals, as well 
as the written assignment to the corporation in which Fewel 
openly refers to the contract as being between Pratt and 
himself. In this context Fewel's statement does not con-
stitute evidence substantial enough to support the finding 
of the trial court. 
[3, 4] It is well established in California that a contract 
which requires the performance of unlawful acts is unen-
forceable. (Civ. Code, secs. 1608, 1667; LevinsQn v. Boas, 150 
Cal. 185 [88 Pac. 825, 11, Ann. Cas. 661, 12 L. R. .A. (N. S.) 
575]; La Rosa v. Glaze, 18 Cal. App. (2d) 354 [63 Pac. 
(2d) 1181].) Former section 633aa of the California Po-
litical Code (now Insurance Code, sec. 1714) provided: "Any 
person who shall act or offer to act or assume to act as a 
life insurance broker or agent, unless licensed by the insur-
ance commissioner as provided in this section . . . shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor." On the facts presented, the con-
tract under consideration was between Pratt and Fewel as 
an individual. Since Fewel was at no time licensed as an 
insurance broker or agent, he could not legally solicit insur-
ance or receive commissions; therefore, neither he nor his 
assign.ees can enforce the contract. It is true that an un-
licensed person is not precluded from recovering a commis-
sion if he secures such license by the time the contract is 
performed, although it was executed prior to the time he 
was licensed. (Houston v. Williams, 53 Cal. App. 267 [200 
Pac. 55] ; Radich v. Oernokus, 65 Cal. App. 452 [224 Pac. 
124] ; Brenneman v. Lane, 87 Cal. App. 414 [262 Pac. 400].) 
In the present situation, however, Fewel not only had no 
license at the time he entered into the contract, but never 
acquired one thereafter. All the acts which he performed 
under the contract were illegal and can therefore give rise 
to no enforceable obligation. 
~ 
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[5] The subsequent assignment by Fewel to the corpora-
tion of his right to receive payments under the contract in 
no way purported to substitute the corporation in Fewel's 
stead as a party to the original agreement, nor did the as-
signee-corporation undertake to perform any of the duties 
under the agreement. The assignment read: 
"Know all men by these presents: That I, Richard W. 
Fewel, of Los Angeles, California, for a valuable considera-
tion, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby 
sell, assign, transfer and set over unto Moore, Fewel & Com-
pany its successors and assigns, all my right, title and in-
terest in and to any and all commissions and renewal com-
missions for life insurance policies written on the life of 
John G. Bullock and accruing to me under and by virtue 
of an agreement between Franklin L. Pratt and myself, pro-
viding for the payment of one-half of said commissions to me. 
September 1,1928. 
" (Signed) RICHARD W. FEWEL." 
The wording of the assignment clearly indicates that Fewel 
was merely transferring to the corporation the right to re-
ceive payments of money in return for a valuable considera-
tion. There is no assumption of obligations by the corpora-
tion. There is no novation effected whereby the corporation 
steps into Fewel's shoes as obligor under the contract. The 
obligations of the agreement remained with Fewel; he per-
formed them, and it was his performance of them without 
a license which rendered the contract illegal. 
The assignment clearly states that the contract was between 
Fewel as an individual and Pratt. No assignment of rights 
would have been necessary had Fewel made the contract on 
behalf of the corporation, for the latter could then simply 
have adopted the contract as its own. (Ballantine, Private 
Corporations, sec. 47.) 
[6] Pratt is not estopped from denying the validity of 
his contract with Fewel because he accepted receipts from 
Fewel in the name of the corporation to conceal the illegality 
of the transaction. An illegal contract cannot be ratified, 
and no person can be estopped from denying its validity. 
(Oolby v. Title Ins. db Tr. 00., 160 Cal. 632 [117 Pac. 913, 
Ann. Cas. 1913A, 515, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 813]; Reno v. 
American Ice Machine 00., 72 Cal. App. 409 [237 Pac. 784] ; 
Wood v. Impericil Irr. Dist., 216 Cal. 748 [17 Pac. (2d) 
.. 
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128] ; Regan v. Albin, 219 Cal. 357 [26 Pac. (2d) 475]; 
A. L. I. Restatement, Contracts, sees. 590, 598.) 
[7, 8] Defendant in his answer denied any liability under 
the contract. He introduced evidence at the trial showing that 
Fewel was at no time a licensed agent or broker. He moved 
in the trial court to vacate the judgment and to have judg-
ment entered in his favor on the ground that the contract 
was illegal and hence unenforceable. In his brief on appeal 
he urged the illegality of the contract as grounds for reversal. 
'l'here is therefore no basis for precluding him from raiGing 
the question of illegality on appeal. If the contract is ille-
gal as a matter of law, this court may refuse to enforc.:e it 
regardless of the pleadings of the parties. (Morey v. Pala-
dini, 187 Cal. 727 [203 Pac. 760] ; Pacific Wharf etc. Co. v. 
Standard Am. Dredging Co;, 184 Cal. 21 [192 Pac. 847]; 
Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721 [16 Pac. (2d) 673]; 
Kreamer v. Earl, 91 Cal. 112 [27 Pac. 735] ; Dean v. McNer-
ney, 91 Cal. App. 206 [266 Pac. 975] ; 6 Cal. Jur. 162; 4 Cal. 
Jur. Supp. 71, 72.) 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed. 
Edmonds, J., Gibson, 0.. J., and Houser, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree with the conclusion reached in the opinion 
prepared by Mr. Justice Traynor for the reason that it is 
predicated upon an incorrect statement of the facts of this 
case as they appear in the record and as found by the trial 
court, and the rules of law relied upon in said opinion are 
not applicable to the factual situation as disclosed by the 
record and determined by the findings of the trial court. 
In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed with the 
modifications hereinafter mentioned. 
As a correct understanding of the facts is essential to the 
solution of every legal problem, I will state the facts of this 
case as they appear in the record and as f~und by the trial 
court. They are as follows: 
During the early part of the year 1928, Richard W. Fewel 
was a partner in an insurance brokerage firm known as 
"Universal Underwriters." Fewel was married to John G. 
Bullock's daughter. Pratt approached Fewel around the 
10th day of July, 1928, and suggested that between the two 
of them they could sell Bullock some additional life insur-
~~ 
I 
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ance. Thereupon, Pratt gave Fewel a letter of that date 
agreeing to an equal division of commissions on such insur-
ance as was purchased by Bullock. Fewel at the time was 
planning the organization of a new corporation to take over 
his insurance business. The organization of the corporation 
was completed July 25, 1928, under the corporate name of 
Moore, Fewel & Company. On September 1, 1928, Richard 
W. Fewel assigned the contract with Pratt covering the Bul-
lock life insurance commissions to Moore, Fewel & Company, 
of which he was then an officer and stockholder. Moore, 
Fewel & Company were duly licensed as insurance brokers 
on August 10, 1928. The first policy of life insurance writ-
ten for John G. Bullock was several months after August 10, 
1928. Thereafter, Moore, Fewel & Company assigned the 
Pratt agreement to Moore, Fewel & Devlin, Inc., Ltd. (when 
a new corporation was formed to take in another partner), 
and Moore, Fewel & Devlin in turn assigned it to Moore, 
Fewel & Dawes. Moore, Fewel & Dawes changed its cor-
porate name to Fewel & Dawes, Inc., the respondent herein. 
At all times prior to their respective assignments Richard W. 
Fewel was an officer of the aforesaid corporations. 
Fewel informed Pratt at the time the contract was made 
of his intention to organize a new corporation to take over 
his insurance business and that the Bullock life insurance 
would be handled through the new company, although it 
would have his personal attention. 
During the years 1930, 1931 and 1932, considerable insur-
ance was written on the life of John G. Bullock, resulting in 
the collection by the defendant Pratt of commissions amount-
ing to $23,074.29. It was part of the arrangement between 
the parties that Pratt would keep the records, collect the 
premiums and account to the plaintiff and its assignors 
for the commissions. 
John G. Bullock died September 15, 1933. Prior to his 
death Bullock was unable to pay all the premiums on a large 
amount of life insurance purchased through Pratt and the 
respondent's assignors after the agreement was entered into. 
An arrangement was made between Pratt and the respond-
ent's assignors whereby certain portions of the commissions 
earned would bE; advanr,ed to Bullock and used in keeping 
the insurance in force. 
At the time of Bullock's death there was $4,150.83 due 
Pratt and the respondent on account of the advances so made, 
.. 
.94 FEWEL & DAWES, INC., v. PRATT. [17 C. (2d) 
for which Pratt filed a claim against the Bullock estate. 
This claim was approved and ordered paid by the probate 
(~ourt on December 12, 1935, the same date this action was 
instituted. 
Prior thereto Pratt D;lade a division of commissions, and 
the sum of $2,687.75 was paid to respondent's assignors and 
receipted therefor by Moore, Fewel & Devlin, Inc., Ltd., to 
Pratt. No other amount was ever paid to the respondent, 
'or its assignors. Pratt was not required to account for the 
commissions prior to Bullock's death for the reason that 
Fewel knew a large portion thereof was being advanced back 
to Bullock in order to enable him to pay premiums. After 
Bullock's death and up to the time of institution of the ac-
tion Pratt refused to a.ccount for the reason, among others, 
that all of the commissions had not been collected. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found "that 
the contract was made by Richard W. Fewel as an officer 
and agent of Moore, Fewel & Company and was subsequently 
performed by him as an officer and agent of the other cor-
porations owning it under the respective assignments." 
The trial court further found "that at all times during 
the performance of the contract the respondent and its cor-
porate predecessors in title thereto were duly licensed in-
surance brokers and entitled to one-half of the commissions 
derived from insurance written on the life of John G. Bul-
lock after the date of the contract; that an accounting was 
had in open court wherein it was determined that the gross 
amount of commissions was $23,074.29; and that after credit-
ing the amounts theretofore paid by Pratt to respondent's 
assignor, there was due the plaintiff herein from Pratt the 
sum of $8,849.39 as its share of said commissions." The 
court found against the appellant Pratt on all of his de-
fenses. 
The trial court further found "that the appellant Pratt 
ratified the assignment of the agreement by accepting receipts 
from a subsequent assignee, Moore, Fewel & Devlin, Inc., 
Ltd." 
Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff for the sum 
of $8,849.39, with interest in addition thereto amounting to 
$1993.30. 
The first attempt by the defendant to assert the illegality 
of the agreement of July 10, 1928, was on a motion to vacate 
:~ 
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the judgment and to have a judgment entered in his favor. 
In support of such motion, the defendant contended that the 
agreement of July 10, 1928, was contrary to express statute 
and void for the reason that Fewel was not at that time a 
duly licensed and authorized insurance broker. This mo-
tion was denied by the trial court and defendant appealed. 
It is not true as stated in the majority opinion that: 
"There is no substantial evidence that Pratt agreed tQ 
contract with an actual or contemplated corporation rather 
than with Fewel. Plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden 
of proving that Pratt gave the assent necessary to the com-
pletion of such a contract. On the contrary, it is undis-
puted that Pratt repeatedly insisted he would not work with 
Fewel's associates and would enter into a contract only with 
Fewel individually. Fewel's statement that he could not 
work without his associates in no way establishes that Pratt 
contracted with Fewel and his associates as a corporation." 
In making the foregoing statement, the author of the ma-
jority opinion has disregarded the findings of the trial court 
which found the facts directly in conflict with said state-
ment. These findings are supported by substantial evidence 
in the form of testimony of witnesses and inferences which 
the trial court was justified in drawing from the testimony 
and conduct of the parties. 
So that there will be no question as to the testimony upon 
which the foregoing statement is based, I will quote the 
testimony of the witnesses verbatim. Fewel testified as Tvl-
lows: 
"A. I will say this-that I was authorized at all time!'! to 
negotiate with Mr. Bullock and Mr. Pratt, from the very 
inception they knew I was handling it; that Mr. Pratt didn't 
want anything to do with Mr. Moore, and I told him so; 
he told me he did not care to do business with Mr. Moore, 
he wanted to do business with me; that I was Mr. Bullock's 
son-in-law; he said, 'I don't want to do business with the 
corporation, but I will do business through your corporation 
with you.' I said, 'All right.' 
"A. No, he said he didn't want to do business with Mr. 
Moore and my associates; that he didn't care if the corpora-
tion or my company or my associates participated, but he 
wanted the contract with me; that I was Mr. Bullock's son-
in-law and he did not see any reason whatever for them to 
• 
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come into the picture. I explained to him on the first mat-
ter, as I told you before, I told him that I was associated 
with these people, and whatever I did I did it with them." 
Defendant Pratt testified: 
"I told Mr. Bullock, in Mr. Fewel's presence, that I 
couldn't legally do what we had agreed to do, but that I 
didn't want to be the beneficiary of that inability to do a 
thing I had contracted to do in good faith and that I would 
give any broker or anyone qualified legally to receive the 
commissions the amount involved. Q. -So therefore you 
paid it to Moore, F'ewel & Devlin? A. -Mr. F'ewel said that 
if I would give the commissions to Moore, F'ewel & Dev-, 
lin he would arrange to see that he got the credit over there. 
Q. -Well, was that agreeable to you? A. Yes, so far as 
giving away commissions is agreeable." 
As I read the foregoing testimony I am forced to the con-
clusion that the trial court was justified in concluding as 
it did conclude that Fewel advised Pratt that the agreement 
between them was to be performed by Fewel and his associ-
ates who were later organized into a corporation which imme-
diately became licensed as an insurance broker; that Pratt 
dealt with said corporation by paying to it one-half of the 
premiums which he collected on insurance policies written 
for Bullock; that Pratt thereby ratified the assignment of 
said agreement from Fewel to the corporation and by Moore, 
Fewel & Company, a corporation, to its successors in interest. 
The majority opinion also states that "It was therefore 
agreed that Fewel should issue a receipt signed 'Moore, Fewel 
. & Devlin by Richard W. Fewel' to enable Pratt to show a 
legal transaction on his books. Pratt made out his check 
for the commissions to Fewel personally. Fewel deposited 
, the check in his private account which he alone used. Other 
commissions were subsequently divided in the same manner, 
the last division being made on February 19, 1931." 
The foregoing statement is only half true as the record 
shows without contradiction that Fewel had an understand-
ing with the board of directors of the corporations, of which 
he was a director and officer, that while the portion of the 
premiums on Bullock's life insurance polieies to which the ..... 
corporations were entitled were to be paid to him and !:ly 
him to Bullock on an indebtedness which Fewel owed to 
Bullock, Fewell would be charg'ec:l on tb.e boo&s ':If tb~ corpo-
~ 
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ration with such premiums, and his account with the cor-
poration would be adjusted when the subsequent premiums 
were paid. In this regard Fewel testified: 
"I was vice-president, I believe; and I spoke to them-
under my obligation to Mr. Bullock that lowed him so 
much money, and that I had an understanding with him that 
I would take these profits, the first year's profits and give 
them to him against my indebtedness, but that I would give 
the renewals to them, and they could charge me back for 
whatever I withdrew against my account, which was the cur-
rent account. 
"Q. You mean by that whenever you gave any of these 
commissions to Mr. Bullock, that the brokerage firm charged 
you with that money? A. They agreed to such an arrange-
ment and we would work it out sooner or later. I explained 
it was going to be a big amount of insurance and renewals; 
and I was the only one in the corporation that was not draw-
ing a sizable salary, and I thought I was entitled to some-
thing, and it had to be along this line to work it out. 
"Q. Did they agree with that 1 A. They agreed with that 
-Mr. Bullock understood it thoroughly. 
"A. I testified that I later had an agreement with Mr. 
Moore, who was attending to the life insurance end of our 
corporation-I informed him. that I was heavily indebted 
to Mr. Bullock; that I was to take no compensation out of 
the company; that he and Mr. Devlin were drawing good 
salaries; that Mr. Bullock felt that I should get something 
out of it and pay him on account of what lowed him; and 
I thought we should have some kind of understanding with 
them whereby I could return those first year's premiums to 
Mr. Bullock, to credit my account; they would get the re-
newals, and eventually they could charge the amount I gave 
Mr. Bullock and eventually we would wipe it out on other 
commissions we wrote. 
"Q. When did you have the understanding with Moore, 
Fewel & Company? A. The first time I talked it over, I 
think, was with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dawes; and they said 
they could not agree on it until we had a board of directors' 
meeting; and I talked to the boys in the board of directors' 
meeting one day and they agreed that that was fair enough." 
The only conclusion which one can draw from the fore-
going testimony is that whatever service Fewel rendered in 
17 O. (2d)-4 
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connection with the performance of the agreement between 
himself and Pratt of July 10, 1928, was rendered and per-
. formed by him as an officer and director of the corporations 
to which said contract had been assigned. 1'hese corpora-
tions were licensed as insurance brokers at the time all of 
the insurance policies were issued to Bullock and at the time 
the premiums became due thereon with the exception of 
two 6f said policies hereinafter mentioned. In view of the 
findings of the trial court, which are amply supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, the facts of this case do 
not warrant the application of the rule enunciated in the 
cases of Levinson v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185 [88 Pac. 825, 11 Ann. 
Cas. 661, 12 L'. R. A. (N. S.) 575], and La Rosa v. Glaze, 
18 Cal. App. (2d) 354 [63 Pac. (2d) 1181], relied upon 
in the majority opinion. 
The leading case of Levinson v. Boas, supra, involved a 
pawn broker who was operating a pawn shop in violation 
of the law. The court stated in its opinion: "The respond-
ent, neither at the time of making loans or at any time, had 
a license to carryon or conduct the business of pawn broker." 
Likewise, in the case of La Rosa v. Glaze, supra, the plain-
tiff in that action never at any time had a license as agent, . ,. 
commission merchant, or dealer in farm products, as required -
by section 1263 of the Agricultural Code. 
n has been uniformly held that an unlicensed person is 
not precluded from recovering a commission, if he had such 
license at the time the contract was performed and the cause 
of action arose, although the contract under which he seeks 
to recover commissions may have been executed prior to the 
time he was licensed. (Houston v. Williams, 53 Cal. App. 
267 [200 Pac. 55]; Radich v. Oernokus, 65 Cal. App. 452 
[224 Pac. 124] ; Brenneman v. Lane, 87 Cal. App. 414 [262 
Pac. 400].) 
In each of the above-mentioned cases, a real estate broker's 
contract was involved. A contract authorizing a real estate 
agent to sell real property on a commission basis had been 
entered into before the agent had obtained a license pursu-
ant to the law of this state, but a license had been obtained 
by him before the sale was consummated and his right to 
the commission had accrued. It is true that the court in 
the Houston case predicated its opinion upon the wording 
of section 20 of the act, which provide!; that 110 person en-
gaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a real 
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estate broker shall bring or maintain any action in the courts 
of this state for collection of compensation for the perform-
ance of any of the acts mentioned in section 20 of the said 
act without alleging and proving that said person was a 
duly licensed real estate broker at the time the alleged cause 
of action arose. 
In the case of Davis v. Ohipman, 210 Cal. 609, at page 622 
[293 Pac. 40), this court, in referring to the case of Houston 
v. Williams, supra, said: 
"In Houston v. Williams, supra, it was held that a limi-
tation upon this rule was made by section 20 of the act, 
and that the rule in all its rigor should not apply to a person 
holding a broker's license at the time he consummated a 
sale of real property even though he had no such license at 
the time he entered into a contract with the owner to pay 
him a commission. The court there held that a reasonable 
construction of the act would permit such a holding. While 
agreeing with the appellate court in this ruling, we are fur-
ther of the opinion that it would be a most unreasonable 
construction of the statute to hold that it permitted an action 
to be maintained as in the present proceeding where the plain-
tiff had no license at the date the sale of the property was 
effected, or during any of the time during which he rendered 
the services for which he seeks to recover, and only secured 
such a license practically a year after the sale was effected. 
As plaintiff held no broker's license at the time the sale in-
volved herein was consummated, he is not entitled to recover 
compensation for his services, all of which were rendered 
prior to his securing any license." 
The inevitable conclusion at which one must arrive from 
a reading of the above-mentioned cases is that it was the 
intention of the legislature to denounce the performance of 
certain acts by a person whom the law required to procure 
a license before such acts can be performed. In the case of 
a real estate broker, it was the sale of real estate on a com-
mission basis; in the case of an insurance broker, it was the 
solicitation or sale of insurance. In other words, it was the 
doing of something in connection with the conduct of the 
business of such agent or broker which constitutes a viola-
tion of the statute, instead of merely agreeing to perform 
such acts at some future date, when the person performing 
the same has complied with the requirements of the law with 
respect to obtaining: the license. 
" 
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The record conclusively shows that the respective assignee 
corporations to which the agreement was transferred were 
licensed insurance brokers throughout the entire time of per-
formance under the agreement, except as hereinafter stated. 
Moore, Fewel & Company was licensed from August 10, 1928, 
to June 30, 1930; Moore, Fewel & Devlin, Inc., Ltd., from 
July 1, 1930, to June 30, 1932; Moore, Fewel & Dawes from 
July 1,1932, to October 6, 1933. On October 11, 1933, Moore, 
Fewel & Dawes, Inc., Ltd., changed its corporate name to 
Fewel & Dawes, Inc. There was a lapse in its license from 
October 6, 1933, to November 10, 1933. Performance under 
the agreement having come to an end with the death of 
John G. Bullock, and respondent being a duly licensed life 
insurance broker at the time of performance and at the com-
mencement of this action, it is not material that there was 
a lapse in the corporation's license from October 6, 1933, to 
November 10, 1933. Moore, Fewel & Dawes was, however, 
not licensed when two policies were issued February 17, 1932. 
Those premiums should be eliminated from the judgment. 
The agreement of July 10, 1928, was a continuing agree-
ment or contract and there is nothing to show that such 
contract was not to exist as long as Pratt procured insur-
ance under said agreement. The evidence shows that Bul-
lock contemplated taking out $150,000 additional insurance 
at the time the written agreement was executed. Pratt had 
no option to terminate the contract at will. There is no 
evidence that the contract was terminated on February 19, 
1931, as contended by appellant. The contract could only 
be terminated by the mutual consent of· all parties. Find-
ings number 27 and number 28 to the effect that the contract 
was not terminated are supported by the evidence. 
There is no merit in the contention that a proper account-
ing was not had between the parties. An accounting was 
held and the record fails to show any prejudice to appellant 
with the exception of the item of interest which was allowed. 
Respondent introduced in evidence a record containing a 
list of the companies, the policies and premiums and the 
commissions which were earned. Appellant reserved the 
right to check the correctness of this record, and to offer 
evidence of any error which it might contain. The court 
found that appellant was paid $23,074.29, as commissions 
under the agreement, and that respondent's share of 50 per 
cent thereof amounted to $11,537.14. The court also found 
.:.! 
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that respondent's assignors had been paid by appellant on 
account of its share of said commissions only the sum of $2,-
687.75, leaving a balance due to respondent under the agree-
ment of $8,849.39. That finding is supported by the evi-
dence, ex'cept as hereafter stated. 
It is true that the corporate name of Moore, Fewel & Dev-
lin was changed in 1932 to Moore, Fewel & Dawes. The 
contract involved in this case was assigned to the last-men-
tioned corporation January 12, 1932, which was not licensed 
as a broker until JUly 1, 1932. During the interval between 
the date of assignment of the contract to the last-mentioned 
corporation and the issuance of its broker's license, Pratt 
procured two policies on the life of Bullock of $25,000 each 
and two renewals of premiums, on or about February 17, 
1932, from which commissions aggregating the sum of $2,-
146.81 were received by Pratt. While the assignor's license 
was in full force during that interval, I assume that since 
title to the contract was then in the name of Moore, Fewel & 
Dawes, which was not then licensed as a broker, it would 
not be entitled to share in such commissions. The judgment 
of $8,849.39 should therefore be modified by subtracting 
therefrom said sum of $2,146.81. 
Findings numbers 24 and 25 with respect to the interest 
allowed are not supported by the ~vidence. The record fails 
to disclose the dates of payments of commissions to appellant. 
At least it is impossible to determine which dates refer to 
the specific times when the commissions were received by the 
appellant. The record therefore fails to show that respond-
ent is entitled to interest on unpaid commissions which were 
received by the. appellant. The judgment should also be 
modified by disallowing the items of interest in the sum of 
$1993.30. 
There is no merit whatever in appellant's contention that 
the contract of JUly 10, 1928, was not assignable, or that he 
could not be compelled to recognize the assignee thereof, as 
the evidence is undisputed that appellant dealt with the cor-
porate assignees of Fewel, and accepted receipts signed by 
said assignees for commissions paid Fewel, pursuant to said 
contract. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that even 
though appellant did not contemplate contracting with the 
corporate assignees of Fewel at the time he entered into said 
agreement, he is, nevertheless, estopped by his conduct from 
contending that the assignment of the agreement by Fewel 
• 
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terminated the contract and that the assignee acquired no 
rights thereunder by virtue of the various assignments 
thereof. 
As I view this case, however, in view of the findings of the 
trial court, I am of the opinion that the contract of July 
10, 1928, was made by Fewel on behalf of the corporation 
which he contemplated organizing, and the assignment thereof 
by Fewel to the corporation was a mere formality and was 
not essential to secure to said corporation the rights to which 
it was entitled under said contract. 
The evidence is sufficient to support the findings of the 
trial court that said contract was made by Fewel as an 
officer and agent of Moore, Fewel & Company, and was sub-
sequently performed by him as an officer and agent of the 
other corporations to which it was assigned. 
Appellant has attempted to raise the proposition of res 
adjudicata against the judgment recovered by respondent in 
this case. This proposition is presented by way of a motion 
to take additional evidence in this court, pursuant to sec-
tion 956a of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
The judgment which appellant contends is res adjudicata 
of the judgment herein appealed from was entered Septem- , 
ber 8, 1937, approximately 15 months after the entry of the -,! 
judgment in the case at bar; said judgment of September 8, 
1937, arose out of the following factual situation; 
About December 12, 1933, respondent levied an attachment 
upon certain funds held by the executors of the estate of 
John G. Bullock. After entry of judgment on June 24, 
1936, no stay having been obtained by appellant, execution 
was levied by the respondent against these same funds. The 
executors thereupon filed an action of interpleader, and paid 
the moneys into court, alleging that numerous claims had 
been made thereto by various creditors of said Franklin L. 
Pratt. Respondent filed an answer and cross-complaint in 
this action, setting forth its claim to the interpleaded fund. 
The cross-complaint sets forth and alleges a prior right to 
the interpleaded fund for the reasons that, (1) The rights of 
other claimants were based on certain assignments from Pratt 
which constituted fraudulent conveyances, and (2) The fund 
was impressed with a constructive trust therefore no assign-
ments could be validly made by Pratt. 
The court in this interpleader action found that Fewel 
& Dawes, Inc., was entitled to recover said moneys sub-
I 
I 
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ject to the right of two other claimants, who held valid 
assignments from Pratt. The court also found that the 
interest of Fewel & Dawes, Inc., existed, however, only by 
virtue of the levy of the writ of attachment and the sub-
sequent levy of a writ of execution. As to the second cause 
of action, which was predicated on the theory of a construc-
tive trust in the fund for the benefit of respondent corpora-
tion, the court found that no such trust existed. The find-
ings of fact determined that the contract of July 10, 1928, 
was not made with or on behalf of Moore, Fewel & Company; 
that, on the contrary the agreement was made with Rich-
ard W. Fewel and that it was void, as he was not a licensed 
life insurance agent or broker at the time of said agreement, 
nor at any time thereafter; that the claim for the funds in 
question from the estate of John G. Bullock, deceased, was 
properly made in behalf of Franklin L. Pratt. The judg-
ment in this interpleader action was entered on November 8, 
1937, and became final after time for appeal had elapsed. 
Appellant sought to introduce that final judgment as evi-
dence in this case to establish it as res adjudicata and to 
create an estoppel. 
I am of the opinion it was not the court's province in the 
suit of interpleader to challenge the judgment upon which 
execution had issned. The sole issue which was presented 
to the court in that cause of action was neither involved in 
nor determinative of the issues in the present suit. The 
issue before the court in that action raised the question as 
to whether the appellant, Pratt, was a trustee of the inter-
pleaded fund, and as such, whether he violated his duty 
as trustee by assigning that fund to various claimants. A 
finding that he was not a trustee of said fund for the bene-
fit of the respondent herein did not determine the issues 
presented in this suit for an accounting. That final judg-
ment, therefore, is not res adj1ldicata of the issues presented 
in this case. . 
An examination of the cases cited by appellant fails to 
disclose any precedent for the application of res adjudicata 
or estoppel under the circumstances of this case. 
I am forced to the conclusion, after a very careful exami-
nation of the record and briefs in this case that every con-
sideration of equity and justice is on the side of the plain-
tiff and respondent in this case, and that the defendant and 
appellant is attempting to evade an obligation which he con-
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tracted in good faith to perform and which he did perform 
until the death of Bullock, but when he saw no further 
opportunity to advance his own interests by continuing to 
secure the cooperation of Fewel and his corporation, he re-
pudiated his obligation and is now attempting to resort to 
technical defenses to defeat a just obligation which he con-
tracted in good faith, with full knowledge of all the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the arrangement which he 
himself made with Fewel and which the trial court found 
had been faithfully executed by Fewel and his successors 
in interest. To now permit the defendant to prevail under 
such circumstances, will, in my opinion, result in a miscar-
riage of justice which should not be countenanced by any 
court. 
The judgment should be modified by striking therefrom 
the commissions on the policies and renewals of February 
17, 1932, aggregating the sum of $2,146.81, and the items of 
interest allowed in the sum of $1993.30, and as so modified, 
the judgment should l>e affirmed. 
Curtis, J., and Shenk, J., concurred. 
[Sac. No. 5404. In Bank.-January 27, 1941.] 
FLORA J. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO 
BANK & UNION TRUST COMPANY (a Banking 
Corporation) et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Partition-New Trial and Appeal-Appeal and Error-Deci-
sions Appealable.-Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 
9£3, an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory decree in a 
partition suit that determines the rights of the parties, whether 
it directs partition in kind or by a sale and division of the 
proceeds, and this notwithstanding the reservation until the 
final decree of the allowance of attorneys' fees and costs of 
suit. 
1. See 20 Cal. Jur. 663; 20 R. C. L. 770. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Partition, § 72 (2); 2. Appeal and 
Error, § 400; 3. Appeal and Error, § 425. 
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[2] Appeal and Error-Supersedeas and Stay of Proceedings-
Upon Security or Filing Notice of Appeal-Necessity of Secu-
ritY-Particular Judgments Stayed by Cost Bonds or Taking 
Appeal.-In the absence of specific provision concerning an 
interlocutory judgment of partition, under Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, section 949, the perfecting of an appeal stays pro-
ceedings in the lower court upon such a decree. 
[3] ld.-Supersedeas and Stay of Proceedings-Upon Allowance 
by Court or Judge on Order or Writ of Appellate Court-
Grounds for Allowance or Refusal of Writ.-A petition for a 
writ of supersedeas will be denied as unnecessary where the 
perfecting of an appeal itself operates as a stay of proceed-
ings in the trial court. 
APPLICATION for a Writ of Supersedeas to stay all pro-
ceedings pending appeal from a judgment of the Superior 
Court of Merced County. James D. Garibaldi, JUdge. Writ 
denied. 
Edwin H. Williams for Appellant. 
George H. Johnston for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-In a partition action brought by Flora J. 
Williams, the court rendered a decree ordering the property 
sold and the proceeds divided in proportion to the interest 
of each party. She then appealed from that decree upon the 
ground that the property should be partitioned in kind, and 
now seeks a writ of supersedeas to stay all proceedings au-
thorized by it until the decision upon her appeal. 
The controversy concerns 310 acres of land, one-quarter 
of which, the superior court decided, is owned by the peti-
tioner. The remaining three-fourths was decreed to be owned 
by the respondent Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Oom-
pany, as trustee. The court further determined that the 
petitioner is entitled to partition, but that as it cannot be 
made in kind without great prejudice to the owners, a sale 
of the property is necessary. By other provisions of the 
decree the court appointed referees and directed them to 
sell the land, subject to confirmation, reserving the right to 
allow and apportion attorneys' fees, the expenses of sale, and 
costs in a final decree. 
'l.'he petitioner contends that an appeal may be taken from 
an interlocutory decree which determines the rights of the 
